NASA Office of Logic Design

A scientific study of the problems of digital engineering for space flight systems,
with a view to their practical solution.

References: Military Specifications

FPGA Military Specifications

Non-volatile Memories Military Specifications

Test Methods

Title

Abstract

SIMULTANEOUS SWITCHING NOISE MEASUREMENTS FOR DIGITAL MICROELECTRONIC DEVICES MIL-STD-883E, METHOD 3024 19 August 1994 883_3024_sso.pdf

Purpose. This method establishes the procedure for measuring the ground bounce (and VCC bounce) noise in digital microelectronic devices or to determine compliance with specified ground bounce noise requirements in the applicable acquisition document. It is also intended to provide assurance of interchangeability of devices and to eliminate misunderstanding between manufacturers and users on ground bounce noise test procedures and requirements. This procedure is not intended to predict the amount of noise generated on an end product board, but for use in measuring ground bounce noise using a standardized method for comparing noise levels between logic families and vendors.

Title	Abstract
FUZE DESIGN, SAFETY CRITERIA FOR MIL-STD-1316E 10 JULY 1998 SUPERSEDING MIL-STD-1316D, 9 APRIL 1991 mil_std_1316e_fuze_design.pdf	Foreward (excerpt) 3. This standard establishes specific design safety criteria for fuzes. It applies primarily to the safety and arming functions performed by fuzes for use with munitions. The safety and arming requirements specified herein are mandatory fundamental elements of design, engineering, production and procurement of fuzes. Fuzes shall provide safety that is consistent with assembly, handling, storage, transportation, and disposal. 4. Munition fuzes historically have utilized sensitive explosive elements whose output has been physically interrupted until arming. Control of the arming process in these fuzes was accomplished by mechanical means. The advent and rapid advancement in solid state electronics has furnished alternatives for fuze safety design. In recent years, advances in explosive initiation elements have provided an option for eliminating the need for physical interruption of the explosive train. The application of these technology advances is addressed in the Current revision to these standards.
STANDARD PRACTICE FOR SYSTEM SAFETY MIL-STD-882D 10 February 2000   SUPERSEDING MIL-STD-882C, 19 January 1993 mil_std_882d_sys_safety.pdf	Foreward (excerpt) 2. The DoD is committed to protecting: private and public personnel from accidental death, injury, or occupational illness; weapon systems, equipment, material, and facilities from accidental destruction or damage; and public property while executing its mission of national defense. Within mission requirements, the DoD will also ensure that the quality of the environment is protected to the maximum extent practical. The DoD has implemented environmental, safety, and health efforts to meet these objectives. Integral to these efforts is the use of a system safety approach to manage the risk of mishaps associated with DoD operations. A key objective of the DoD system safety approach is to include mishap risk management consistent with mission requirements, in technology development by design for DoD systems, subsystems, equipment, facilities, and their interfaces and operation. The DoD goal is zeromishaps. 3. This standard practice addresses an approach (a standard practice normally identified as system safety) useful in the management of environmental, safety, and health mishap risks encountered in the development, test, production, use, and disposal of DoD systems, subsystems, equipment, and facilities. The approach described herein conforms to the acquisition procedures in DoD Regulation 5000.2-R and provides a consistent means of evaluating identified mishap risks. Mishap risk must be identified, evaluated, and mitigated to a level acceptable (as defined by the system user or customer) to the appropriate authority, and compliant with federal laws and regulations, Executive Orders, treaties, and agreements. Program trade studies associated with mitigating mishap risk must consider total life cycle cost in any decision. Residual mishap risk associated with an individual system must be reported to and accepted by the appropriate authority as defined in DoD Regulation 5000.2-R. When MIL-STD-882 is required in a solicitation or contract and no specific references are included, then only those requirements presented in section 4 are applicable.
MUNITION ROCKET AND MISSILE MOTOR IGNITION SYSTEM DESIGN, SAFETY CRITERIA FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DESIGN CRITERIA STANDARD   MIL-STD-1901A 6 June 2002 SUPERSEDING MIL-STD-1901, 22 JANUARY 1992 mil_std_1901a_rm_ignition.pdf	Foreward (excerpt) The purpose of this standard is to establish specific design safety criteria for Ignition Systems and Ignition Safety Devices intended for use with munition rockets and missilemotors. The safety, arming, and firing requirements specified herein are mandatory fundamental elements of engineering design, development, and testing. Ignition systems shall provide primary safety for propulsion systems consistent with assembly, handling, storage, transportation, operational readiness, and use or disposal. The inadvertent actuation of a munition propulsion system can result in catastrophic material damage and injury or death to personnel. Every effort must be made during the development of munition propulsion systems with their associated initiation systems, to achieve a high degree of safety through the incorporation of good design features and the selection and use of materials and operating procedures. The thrust toward in-field testing of powered weapons further increases the exposure of operating personnel to the threat of inadvertent actuation of the munition propulsion system.

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